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NARRATIVES FROM CALL SHOP USERS: 
EMOTIONAL PERFORMANCE OF VELOCITY
SIMONE BELLI, ROM HARRÉ AND LUPICINIO IÑIGUEZ
Abstract: In recent years, the debate on emotions has been influenced by postconstructionist research, 
particularly the use of performativity as a key concept. According to Judith Butler (1993, 1997) the 
construction of emotions is a process open to constant change and redefinition. The final result of emotion-
language “natural” development is what is known as technoscience. New ways of naming emotions have 
emerged within technoscience. In our research on the use of information and communication technologies 
(ICT) by cyber-café and call shop users, we came to understand how these technologies are significant 
in those users’ daily life. The emphasis will be on analyzing emotions related to the use of ICT in the 
aforementioned settings. Using the concept of performance (Butler, 1990), we will explore how narratives 
create a need for particular emotions, which did not exist before they were performed. To understand this 
performance, we use an ad hoc tool called Membership Categorization Analysis (MCA) as it is used by the 
Manchester School. Analysis has revealed the existence of a membership category in which velocity is salient 
as performance. This ‘velocity’ seems to follow the evolution of technoscience in the social sciences. We will 
observe velocity in the context created by two concepts, Donna Haraway’s (1990) cyborg and Alessandro 
Baricco’s (2007) mutant.
Keywords: emotions; performance; velocity; Membership Categorization Analysis (MCA); 
information and communication technology (ICT).
In recent years, the debate on emotions has been influenced by postconstructionist 
research (Íñiguez, 2005), particularly the use of performativity as a key concept. According 
to Judith Butler (1993), the construction of emotions is a process open to constant change 
and redefinition (Butler, 1997). In this vein, the “natural” evolution of emotion and language 
has ultimately led to the appearance of technoscience. New ways of naming emotions have 
emerged from a technoscience perspective (Belli, S., Harré, R., & Íñiguez, L., in press). 
Information and communication technologies (ICT) have resulted in new emotional aspects 
which philosophers, psychologists, and epistemologists have targeted in their common 
interests, for instance, the affective machine (Rose, 1983; Brown, 2005; Brown & Stenner, 
2001; Michael, 2000, 2006), the notions of cyborg and techno-disembodiment (Haraway, 
1989, 1995; James & Carkeek, 1997; Gibbs, 2006; Hollinger, 2000), or the notion of 
“disclosure”, a fuzzy phenomenon meaning the expression of emotions through a screen.
In our research on the use of information and communication technologies (ICT) by cy-
ber-café and call shop users, we have come to understand how these technologies are signifi-
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cant in users’ daily lives. The emphasis has been on analyzing emotions related to the use of 
these technologies in these two specific settings. Using the concept of performance (Butler, 
1990), we explore how narrative constructs a need for particular emotions, which did not ex-
ist before the performance. These performances are seen as natural through their repetition 
over time. They are a set of multiple everyday social interactions. To understand performance 
in narrative, it is necessary to use a “tool”. In our case the tool is called Membership Catego-
rization Analysis (MCA), as used by the School of Manchester (Leudar, 1995, 1998). 
The symbiosis between emotions and ICT opens up a new area of study in which 
emotion is understood as a symbolic process depicted by narrative at its best. For this reason 
it is fundamental to see emotion as a process linked to the way people approach and use ICT. 
Analysis has revealed that velocity is a salient membership category. It is constructed by 
users through narrative as a performative and primarily emotional process. Thus, discursively 
produced ‘velocity’ seems to follow the evolution of technoscience in the social sciences, 
through the concept of the cyborg (Haraway, 1990) and the concept of the mutant (Baricco, 
2008). 
Haraway’s concept of the cyborg helps us understand why the relationship between 
the individual and the machine is like an extension of the person, created by discursive 
performance. We will use this relationship, constructed through narrative, to help us 
to introduce what we will talking about in this article, that is, an analysis of ICT users’ 
interviews in which a new emotional performance emerges. As already asserted, we believe 
that the use of ICT as an extension of a person’s body, as held in the concept of the cyborg, 
is constructed through language. Hence, its use is always discursive. The discursively 
performative use of ICT constructs the relationship, or conflict, between the individual and 
society in a continual iteration of speech acts.
What is an emotional performance? 
When it comes to performance in postconstructionist studies the name of Judith Butler 
is surely the most important. Butler (1993, 1997) considers emotion as a process constantly 
evolving in contemporary narratives. She offers a completely new perspective on the 
depiction of emotions through the concept of performance. Although the term “emotion” is 
not explicit in her writing, it spontaneously arises out of people’s narratives and positions. 
Using the concept of performance, Butler explores how narrative creates a need for particular 
emotions: 
… acts, gestures, enactments, generally construed, are performative in the sense that the 
essence or identity that they otherwise purport to express are fabrications manufactured and 
sustained through corporeal signs and other discursive means (Butler, 1990, p. 136). 
In this way, emotion is a performance produced by these constructions. It is comprised of 
acts which are internally discontinuous, i.e., emotions do not exist prior to being performed. 
There cannot exist a successful “copy” of an emotion which one could expect to use to 
faithfully reproduce a previous event or a new emotion. Performances are seen as natural 
through their repetition over time. They eventually become standards and they come to be 
seen as normal, taken as a set of multiple daily social interactions. 
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Therefore, the concept of performativity in Butler is an attempt to find a way to rethink 
the relationship between social structures and individual agencies. In Butler’s interpretation, 
performativity is understood as that which promotes and supports the implementation of 
certain processes through iterations constrained by certain rules. Such standards should be 
understood in a Wittgensteinian vein, as a spontaneous discursive increase in our feelings. 
We assume that words refer to purely spontaneous processes (Wittgenstein, 1958). Since rules 
are valid only for a particular context, and only for some people, they cannot be duplicated 
and applied in different situations. The politics of performativity requires the iterative power 
of narrative to produce the phenomenon of emotion, for emotion does not exist before we 
say something, before speech is produced. Emotions are designed as socially constructed 
phenomena, and at the same time they construct a social identity which determines that 
the audience has to behave as a performer (Butler, 1990). As explained above, emotions 
do not exist prior to being performed, and they cannot be reused and categorized and listed 
afterwards (Gregson & Rose, 2000, p. 438).
Finding performance in narrative
A key task for researchers is to find the theory in the practice, that is to say, find 
performance in narrative. Using MCA, we have fulfilled our objective of understanding the 
role of performance in the study of emotions in ICT settings.
MCA is a formal analysis of the procedures people use to make sense of other people 
and their activities. Sacks (1992) developed MCA on the basis of the work of Lacan and 
Chomsky, and his then colleague, Emanuel Schegloff. Harold Garfinkel also helped shape 
the MCA from an ethnomethodological perspective. He established that the method should 
involved depicting the way in which people categorize themselves. Membership categories 
are comprised of “categories related to predicates, which may include dispositions, acts, 
tasks, beliefs, and values” (Watson, 1987). Most of the MCA categories are relatively distinct 
(e.g. “mother”, “son”) and we can discuss how these categories are used in narrative. But 
one of the main problems is that these categories are treated as if they were fixed. This 
problem emerges especially in studies of the social and political identity of the body, for 
new categories appear and disappear throughout the analysis. This categorization transcends 
and implies narrative. That is, we are interested in how participants manage the relationship 
between categories (Leudar, 1998). The way they do this is categorized into “collections”, 
“classes”, and “relationships”. But, in our research, what interests us most is what Leudar 
(1998) calls a “distributed discursive network”, that is, how categories and relationships 
interactively emerge from narrative (Leudar, 1995, 1998).
Ivan Leudar’s perspective differs from Sacks’ view because of the particular way in 
which he understands “categories” of codes. According to Leudar, these “categories” 
of codes constantly evolve within narrative. They are never fixed. Instead they change 
continuously, and a member of a code can often change the category itself. It is an open and 
circular dialogic process. This change in category can be perceived owing to linguistic and 
lexical factors produced in social practices.
Another important aspect of Leudar’s approach is that categories must be active; this is 
the key difference between his conception of MCA and Sacks’. Leudar depicts categories as 
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an open system which, at the same time, constantly evolves, coming and going from open to 
closed and vice versa.
Emotions in technoscience 
We saw that emotions have a strong relationship with language (Belli & Íñiguez, 2008), 
especially with regards to the concept of performance (Butler, 1990). We will focus now on 
the “effects” in everyday language. Performance is better understood when we observe that 
some emotions appear and disappear in ordinary discourse. This is because emotions are 
embedded in narratives. They are speech-acts (Oatley & Jenkins, 1992, p.75).
Performance is subject to the power of the narrative of emotions. The narrative 
of emotions is full of smaller narratives on new concepts and metaphors that serve to 
articulate the lexicon of emotional words. Concepts such as techno-disembodiment and the 
human-affective machine are the techno-scientific side of emotions. They represent new 
performances, new emotions appearing in the discursive arena.
Emotions keep on changing in the natural and spontaneous language of everyday life. 
New words enter the discursive arena thanks to performance. Thus, new areas are created in 
the technology sector, like Human-Computer Interactions, Science and Technology Studies, 
etc. (Belli, Harré, & Íñiguez, 2010). This is how emotions begin to enter technological 
narrative as another performance in everyday narrative. The concept of performance related 
to ICT produces new narratives in the social sciences, such as techno-disembodiment and 
the affective machine. Only in recent years has it been understood that emotions and new 
technologies have a very close relationship. This relationship can be observed frequently in 
affective settings: for instance, a mother speaking to her children and family on the phone 
while crying; an immigrant “going out” to a party with her friends in their country of origin 
via the Internet; a chat between young lovers who are actually separated by thousands of 
miles.
In recent research concerned with emotions in technoscience using a pure semiotic 
method, Mike Michael (1996, 2000, 2004, 2006) identifies emotions as affective matter.
These different narratives on affect and emotions in technoscience can be seen in the 
context offered by Nikolas Rose (1983) using the concept of affective matter and the figure 
of a computer-machine that constructs the individual, i.e., the affective machine. This vision 
is embodied in the cyborg (Haraway, 1990, 1995; Hollinger, 2000). Gergen (1990) also offers 
us a reinterpretation of affective matter in the postmodern society.
Steve Brown and Paul Stenner (2001; Brown, 2005) speak of collective emotions in 
technoscience and the consumer society, using the writings of Spinoza, as well as more 
recent authors, such as Schaub (1933) who states that affective matter becomes a human-
machine being.
When we find ourselves before a screen, our most intimate thoughts and feelings 
emerge from a generated series of mechanisms. This process has been labelled disclosure 
in scientific narrative fiction (Aviram & Amichai-Hamburger, 2005; Qian & Scott, 2007). 
Disclosure is one of the most striking aspects that we have found throughout the analysis 
of the interviews we have done for our research. Disclosure helps us to explain how we 
love to talk with strangers, or someone that we already know, but it is only on the screen 
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that we dare to tell them things we would never say face to face, especially things we only 
express in private settings, like emotions themselves. This allows us to understand how these 
technologies are successfully used in different aspects of life. Phenomena such as Facebook 
ensure just that. We contact someone who we already know, but get into a more intimate 
mode, where we can express our hidden emotions or take public relations to another level and 
all through language. This kind of reasoning permits us to rethink the affective relationships, 
the intimate aspect of new technologies, and the emotions we experience when we are in 
front of a computer’s screen.
An example of an affective machine is the construction of technological systems that can 
interact with humans and transmit bio-psychological changes, e.g. shoes, bracelets, t-shirts 
that receive and transmit emotional changes to the individual, so that changes in emotional 
states are registered in their social contexts. These gadgets are just a stage in man-machine 
interaction.
File-selves are of particular interest to us (Harré, 1984). For Harré, the self may be 
present in many different places and may take part in various episodes, though the body is 
actually located in one space and one time. For example, a person may be playing tennis and, 
at the same time, may be being evaluated via her curriculum vitae for a job, or a bank may 
be making a money transfer on her behalf, or police may be investigating her as a potential 
terrorist, etc. This is possible because any individual may feature in a large range of files, i.e., 
recordings of personal information. My body and my accompanying ‘file-selves’ go together.
If we take this example, we can understand the way in which technology has become a 
part of everyday life. A person is working on-line while her friends look at her photos on 
Facebook. They comment on them and then her boyfriend sends her an e-mail. Her mother 
then calls her using Skype and a co-worker sends her an SMS. In addition to these events we 
can begin to add ones that have been previously suggested by Harré. For these reasons, we 
must understand the use of new technology as an extension of the self.
Haraway’s cyborg concept helps us to understand why the relationship between the 
individual and the machine would be like an extension of the same individual, created 
through discursive performances. In turn, this relationship enables us to introduce what 
we will try to set out in the next section, i.e., an analysis of interviews with users of new 
technologies in which a new emotional performance appears: ‘velocity’.
Emotional performance of velocity 
Use Gmail on your mobile, it’s super fast!
(http://mail.google.com 10th October 2008) 
In interviews, emotional performance continually emerges as a membership category. 
It is always present, and is, no doubt, the main candidate in a study of emotions in ICT. 
Emotional performance emerges spontaneously and always takes on different connotations. 
It is growing as an ever-changing category, i.e., as performance. This phenomenon can only 
be understood through MCA, according to the Manchester School. As we saw before, MCA 
helps us to find performance in emotional narratives. Thus, for the reasons already described, 
‘velocity’ appears as a “new” emotional performance in the technoscience discursive arena.
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Emotional performance is an extension of our body and it is used to interact with others 
through ICT. It is discursive since it is only through narrative that it can be constructed. It 
is like the concept of the cyborg (Haraway, 1990) but is entirely linguistic. We will outline 
what an emotional performance is in the next section and try to trace and observe its course, 
finding a way to define ‘velocity’ without minimizing the importance of the constant and 
continuous evolution of its performance, its iteration. We will trace the path of a particular 
performance through narrative analysis and MCA.
Performance has been characterized by three aspects that have emerged inductively: 
speed, efficacy, and ease. These three features have been useful throughout the analysis to 
find this performance and to understand how they are iterated.
Emotional performance is a Membership Category [MC] related to Category Bound 
Activities [CBA] (i.e., activities, actions, verbs) associated with ICT comprising use, 
progress, time, and change. Following the cyborg concept, the use of one’s own body as an 
extension is constructed through language; in other words, this activity is always discursively 
constructed. Thanks to language, it is possible to define the extension, use of ICT, CBA and 
performance. A continuous iteration is created to relate the relationship, or conflict, between 
individual and society, through the use of ICT and discursive performance.
Thus, performance is based on the use of technologies. This is discursively constructed 
through the emotional performance of velocity. In analysis of call shop users’ narratives, 
‘velocity’ appears as a cold emotion transmitting very little, but seducing because of its own 
performance. Velocity goes from being cold and unemotional, or as Illouz (2007) says “a 
frozen emotion”, and becomes a completely true emotion, not cold at all. We can see people 
laughing or crying in front of a screen (Belli & Íñiguez, 2008). 
The respondents we interviewed used the word „technology” to refer to a whole list of 
terms related to a way of understanding emotions as cold, unemotional. This list includes 
design, operation, purchase, etc. It is a list of terms that cannot be regarded as similar to the 
way we have specified emotion before. ‘Unemotional’ is the usual term used to describe the 
emotional side of technology. The term refers to the use of a “cold” device, like the computer, 
to communicate with other people. The cold light of the screen (Baudrillard, 1990, p. 153) 
produces a cool seduction. This is the narcissistic charm of new technology, the cool charm 
of the Internet. But the absence of emotion, when related to the use of ICT to communicate 
with others, changes, evolves. It becomes a performance, an actual emotion.
Extract 11 
210. -yeah ... a lot ... because they agreed to meet at this hour ... hour, in the afternoon over 
there ... there ... morning over here …
211. The web-cam is wonderful ... you see your wife and your kids ... your family ... mother or 
your...
212. grandparents and two ... three hours ... there … crying. You’ll see some crying ... 
mourning ... saying things
213. very very sweet ... then you hear and … it hits you ... doesn’t it?
1 Extracts from non-native speakers call shop users’ narratives.
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Extract 2 
215. I... once I got drunk with some friends watching the webcam
216. I was ... ah ... and cheers! ... (laughs) and drank too (laughs) and we got drunk (laughs) 
Good
217. and “Bye” (laughs) ... It kills yearning... the longing… 
In extracts 1 and 2, we observe how here performance emerges and we can understand its 
“history”. It is an iteration that changes from an unemotional condition, a cold emotion, until 
it becomes a colorful real human emotion. This will all become much clearer as we examine 
the extracts.
We consider it appropriate to treat the unemotional aspect of performance in the first part 
of the analysis, highlighting the importance of the iteration process in this performance. We 
continually see technology as being something cold, but suddenly, when we relate to it, we 
find that it produces a substantial number of real emotions. Only when an MC appears can 
it be identified and defined as such. Emotional performance as MC is flexible, open, and 
dynamic, and thus it may provide meaning and evolve through the narrative. Only by treating 
emotion as a performance, i.e., ‘velocity’, can we understand the iteration.
Extract 3
253. C: Interne: t (.) Maybe: ye: (0.5) Internet and mo: bi: le
254. E: Yeah? (0.3) Is it more friendly?
255. C:> It’s the most friendly <more fast: and (0.2) efficient.
As we mentioned earlier, the emotional performance of velocity is defined by three 
characteristics. These characteristics were identified by interviewees on the Internet, or more 
precisely, while using the Internet: “It’s the most friendly, more fast and effective” (Extract 
3, line 255). However, we will try to understand emotional performance of velocity in detail 
through these three emotional characteristics, and establish how they help to delineate the 
actual iteration. We start with speed:
Extract 4
15. C:> The cyber-cafe have <technology: a:: well (.) advanced and
16. they’re up-da:ted: (0.3) and all> computers are <enough: s fast: s (0.2)
17. and have flat screen, (.) The ones in the cyber: cafe: s. all have WebCams
18. They don’t lack anything (.) you can hear MU: music, you can do (.) works: and (.) several
19. things
We can agree that the MC of “velocity” emerges, in terms of the interviewee, as an 
emotional performance. Terms such as “fast” and detailed descriptions of ICT, such as “flat 
screen”, “have webcams”, “can do”, and “many things” are used. (Extract 4, line 16-17). 
Technological advance is continually present in the interviewee’s narrative. He says “flat 
screen” instead of “display”, when he refers to the speed of technological change. He always 
refers to features of technology, and to how it is continuously changing and rapidly evolving. 
This strict relationship between technological advancement and the use of the technology 
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toward to leads to what we have previously defined as iteration. It is impossible to define, a 
priori, what this iteration is, since it is constantly changing in discursive activity. It changes 
differently among people who communicate through technologies or by using them. Thus, 
speed relates to and redefines the nature of the distinction about progress in technology. But 
all this will be discussed in more detail later.
We know that speed changes depending on advances in new technologies. Speed is never 
a fixed state and it is continually changing. It is a continuous motion in narrative. It is a 
constant iteration as the Butlerian concept of performance (Butler, 1990).
Extract 5
73. Soon I will buy a PDA or a Blackberry.
Extract 6
85. See it, (0.4) perhaps:: I (.) I am abroad (.) and there is a pressing problem (0.3) and I can
86. answer: (0.2) and be able to answer from two thousand kilometers. (0.3) I think
87. These are good:, (0.3) thing: s: aren’t they?
Extract 7
101. C: with all the advantages (0.3) they:’ve improved it
Extract 8
105. lasting. (0.5) I am a person is (0.2) using Mobile phone(0.4)
106. (0.3) has changed mo: bile three: or four time: s
107. E: Yes
108. C: I am not interested: in change: it (0.2) every six months, (0.4) every year (0.2) ‘cause:
109. I found: >not that much< 
Terms like “soon” (Extract 5, line 73), “pressing problem” (Extract 6, line 85), “improved 
it” (Extract 7, line 101), “changed mobile three or four times” (Extract 8, line 106 ), “I am not 
interested in change it every six months (Extract 8, line 108), refer to continuous temporal 
change. The relationship between speed and the use of ICT is directly related to time and 
space.. You cannot repeat that emotional performance in other areas. The success of a copy 
of that emotional performance in others contexts is destined to fail. We must understand that 
time and space are on the move and this movement prompts the performance. 
Extract 9
354. many people spend their lives in the workplace 355. and have no time to go out and 
interact with people, so
356. they go to the computer and try to meet people, that’s it
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Extract 10
424. I’m looking for a room, and it’s a very effective way in my case. I once
425. found a room on the Internet which is faster, the whole
426. craigslist webpage, where people look for job postings
427. rooms for rents, and things like these. This is the advantage. 
As discussed above, time reappears. This is the time which the interviewee does not have, 
which escapes him. The pressing issues, answering mails quickly, as seen previously (Extract 
6, lines 85-86), mean that he did not have time for other things, such as meeting people. “Il 
tempo si fa breve” says Saint Paul of Tarsus, and due to higher velocity new technologies 
allow us to extend time, or to enjoy time in a better way, or to waste it in a more entertaining 
way, for example, Facebook. A strong and steady performance, evolves and revolutionizes the 
social relationships of every individual.
The Internet makes tasks more effective (Extract 10, line 424-427). A number of 
examples help us understand how the use of these new technologies make it more effective, 
faster, and easier for us to undertake our tasks on a daily basis. The performance of ‘velocity’ 
is constructed in everyday life.
As Bauman explains (2006), time has changed, and he uses the example of make-up 
commercials. Make-up lasts for a long-time. It has to last for a considerable amount of 
time. But in the commercial Bauman analyzes, the length of time is only 24 hours, i.e., it is 
assumed that ‘24 hours’ is a long time. It is a new ratio for measuring time, similar to that 
used by people meeting people through Meetic as will be explained later. Another example 
that the time has changed is searching for information on Google. You type “Radiohead” 
and in 0.17 seconds you have 27,000,000 references. If you type “Bauman”, in 0.40 seconds 
you have 3,199,000 references. Time has changed to look information. Nowadays, thanks to 
technology, we have more information in less time. Consumption information is fast, as is the 
consumption of technology.
But velocity for some users is an MC which becomes a “pressing problem” (Extract 6, 
line 85). We need a way to resolve these urgent issues as quickly as possible, and this speed, 
this efficacy, this velocity can only be achieved by purchasing, as the interviewee says, a 
PDA or a Blackberry: 
Extract 11
73. Soon I will buy a PDA or a Blackberry. 
Technological change is the solution, and this change always has to be developed under 
‘velocity’ understood as an emotion.
Just purchasing the technology produces a range of emotions in the individual. The 
happiness experienced on purchasing a new Blackberry or the boredom of still having 
a previous version are reasons for wanting to change. In discursive terms, change and 
technological advance are issues which fall under the emotional performance of velocity. 
Perhaps, the individual has a series of emotions, but we can only know what she is feeling 
if she expresses it. Then, she uses new emotional terms, new words for explaining emotions 
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that already exist. This coincides with the change in the discursive arena. We use new terms 
when discussing the relationship between individual and new technologies. 
The second feature of this emotional performance is efficacy: 
Extract 12
175. databases, in this case Excel, and soon Saf. I can
176. use Saf software. As many people know, it’s a program
177. really good and effective, which has different modules. In my
178. business, in this case, it has modules of accounting, for
179. the whole company’s accounting. It’s good to have all the
180. products of the company checked at any time.
181. You can see them, and then what other departments such as the commercial department 
do.
The characteristic of efficacy can be found at line 177, Extract 12: “really good and 
effective”. This second feature of velocity, throughout the analysis, is related to two Bound 
Activities (BA), which we have seen before: progress and time. “Soon Saf” (Extract 12, line 
175), refers to the technological advancement of this specific software data management in 
companies, and “checked at any time” (Excerpt 12, line 180) is an example of efficacy in its 
purest form.
For these reasons, we consider efficacy a key feature of velocity. It always depends on 
technological improvements and the use of time. For example, “any time” (Excerpt 12, line 
180) refers to instant, to fast.
Extract 14
132. C: Yeah, well, a mp4, that they gave me and I haven’t had time to
133. use it. Yeah I’ve a mp4 for my birthday, but
134. E: Yeah?
135. C: I have had little time. Even I don’t have time to sit and watch it ((mp4))
136. and learn things
Extract 15
16. E: (1.3)>Eh with computer< it’s possible to
17. communicate more easily: (0.2) becau:se: you don’t pay
18. any: fee: s, (0.2) Howe:ve:r, with mobile-phone is
19. more expensive
The concept of time emerged as a crucial component in understanding velocity as an 
emotional performance. Obviously, there is a very strict relationship between velocity and 
time, which is the most frequent relation between MC and BA. One of the basic functions of 
this emotional performance is to gain time: “I have had little time. Even I don’t have time to 
sit” (Extract 14, line 135). There is a continuous race against time. The performance occurs 
as a struggle between gaining time and losing it. For this reason, the concept of gaining time, 
or losing time, introduces us to the third feature of this performance, ‘ease’.
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As seen above, performance cannot be understood in isolation from the use of ICT. We 
have seen what speed and efficacy mean, but for the performance of velocity to be complete, 
it is necessary to define ‘ease’. We think of the ease of communicating, for example: “It’s 
possible to communicate more easily” (Extract 15, line 16-17). But we have to learn to 
use the device. We have to read instructions. Using a new technology always involves the 
time it takes to set up and to learn how to use it. As we have said before, one of the aims of 
achieving velocity is to gain advantage in the tremendous battle against time, and it is for this 
reason that ease is one of velocity’s main features. When things are easy we gain time, but 
where systems and practices are complicated, we lose time. 
Thus these three characteristics, speed, efficacy, and ease, define the continuous 
performance of velocity.
As we said in the first part of this section, individuals use new technology as an extension 
of their own bodies, as in Donna Haraway’s concept of the cyborg, but discursively so as to 
interact with others. This implies activities that allow us to maintain our social relationships, 
our social context.
Extract 16
275. C: it also promotes social and emotional. For what
276. was once a marriage agency to help find your match
277. men and women, now chats have made these
278. businesses fail
279. E: true
280. C: Now because when you look at him online, you go faster
281. than when you are with this person daily. Everything is
282. faster. Though later it may work or not or
283. that things go well
284. E: Like in Meetic.
285. C: Meetic is a, is a topic of which I know nothing, but I know
286. people at work, in this case two girls, who are my same
287. age, I am 32 years now ... and they are normal girls,
288. but because of lack of time or because they haven’t found the appropriate
289. person to go out with, they have gone out or have been normally associated with
290. another person, so they posted an announcement there
291. E: yes, yes
292. C: and receive information on a daily basis, for I have seen it, and they contact
293. with people and stay with a person.
Meeting people through chat rooms and Meetic are activity which illustrates how this 
change in velocity is faster, simpler, and more effective in the social sphere. Emotional 
performance is constructed through the use of new technologies. The Internet is the most 
apt and emblematic technology that can be used in order to understand the process of the 
iteration of velocity, as we said above (Extract 3, line 255). 
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Extract 17
179. - What ... do you think would happen if cyber-cafes disappear? 
180. -Well ... but ... it would be something ... a ... a problem because if not ... but …
181. ... well ... I often call from public phones an ... but here…
182. insert one euro... It’s brief ... really brief ... really brief ... I am ... but ... it lasts enough to say
183. what I want ... but if we didn’t have it ... It would be a big problem ... because 
communication would be...
184. ... there are people who sometimes do not have the need… the money for ...inserting in
185. public phones. Insert four euros ... Thus it would be really, really ....problematic. Using 
cards …
186. ....it would be as it was before. We didn’t have cyber-cafes. Of course ... in those times …
187. ... people who... seven years ago cyber-cafés didn’t exist ... then what did they do? There 
was
188. a sort species of smuggling ... which was for landline only. There were cards for landline 
…
189. but it served for public phones too. Public phones were full of
190. Latin immigrants ... You dialed 900 and you could talk or you insert …
191. coins …
192. . / #-I remember when I got here I started to using cards and there were phones
193. with ... lot of people ... You always had to queue ... (laughs) 
If cyber cafes and call shops were to disappear, and with them the Internet and chat 
rooms, there would be a return to slowness, a return to queuing (Extract 17, line 193). 
Queueing to use the phone is a linguistic metaphor to explain the limited efficacy and 
immediacy brought about by the imagined disappearance of these kinds of places. It is a 
really important place for communicating with others. In call shops there are flat screens, 
web-cams, the latest technology, and the Internet is much faster than it is at home (Extract 15, 
line 16-18). If call shops and all their technologies were to disappear, the MC of “Velocity” 
would also disappear. Velocity would begin to have less effect on the use of new technology. 
The feature would be ‘slowness’. If call shops and cyber-cafes were to disappear, the effect 
would be the slowness of queuing to make calls via public phones.
One of the main features of velocity, as described above, is efficacy. If cyber cafes and 
call shops were to disappear this efficacy would be much less evident in performance. One 
of the interviewees explains step by step how he would make a phone call to his country of 
origin if the call shop were to disappear. It would be “problematic” (Extract 17, line 180); 
“It would be a big problem” (Extract 17, line 183). And he would lose all the benefits the 
cyber cafe provides in order for him to make contact and communicate with his native land. 
In the past, i.e., seven years ago, according to the interviewee, there was no call shop in 
that neighborhood, and it would mean a return to the past if it were to disappear, a return to 
slowness. This is another velocity performance, understood as an emotion. The inability to 
go to the call shop, the lack of access to its technologies would mean a return to the past, to 
“smuggling” cards (Extract 17, line 188). This regression would affect velocity, i.e., speed, 
efficacy, and ease of communication.
Henry Lefebvre (1991, p.120) notes that modern human being ‘have not yet 
“incorporated” to his own lifestyle speed as sequences and rhythms’, thus ‘nerves and senses 
have not yet been adequately trained by urban and technical life’. Consequently, we feel it 
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is appropriate to define velocity as a very important emotional topic in the new discursive 
arena, which technoscience has a major input in and contributes to.
Velocity is a performance that has much in common with the linguistic metaphor of 
surfing in the context of Internet. Linguistic surfing is a term taken directly from the activity 
of riding the waves on a beach. Baricco says (2008, p.111) “Can’t you see the lightness of that 
brain which is hooked on the foam of the waves?” Browsing, i.e., surfing, always involves 
velocity, but not a static velocity, but a dynamic or performative one. Surfing is a very 
smooth motion, but we must be quick or we will lose our balance and fall into the deep sea. 
Such is the emotion of velocity in ICT. Nothing more than that. Baricco uses the example of 
Google, and how people “breathe” through it. They breathe, run, and surf in Google. These 
are new new skills (Baricco, 2008, p.114). In Google, there are paths across the surface which 
can be followed quickly, effectively, and easily. There are rapid sequences, trajectories drawn 
for surfing, movements linking different points in the space of the real. Velocity is a new 
emotional performance, because before the advent of ICT, life was different. Before this we 
had to approach things one by one, to deepen relationships and intimacy in the long run. 
It was a patient task, a matter of study. For example, consider doing a review of scientific 
literature on a particular topic. We had to read a text in full in order to make sense of it, to 
see if it might be of interest in our research. This is not the case nowadays. You know at once. 
By looking for a keyword in the text we can decide if the article or book might be useful in 
our research. Velocity pops up fast as a complete gesture, as a performance. Thus, experience 
requires us to obtain a piece of information which will be enough to lead us to another piece 
of information. The performance is clear if we think of Baricco’s mutant as a discursive 
evolution of Haraway’s cyborg that has learned what the minimum and maximum times for 
doing things are. Mutant uses the search engine to see whether the text is useful to him or 
not. Baricco’s metaphor is powerful and useful in explaining why the emotion of velocity 
emerges from ICT.
Extract 18
222-I use the computer in my leisure time ... for example ... when I have
223 nothing ... or I’m all alone ... and I’m not with Estefania… or my other friend is not at 
home... then I…
224 turn on the computer ... enter to Peru’s webpage ... I read the news ... my country ... what 
happened
225 I enter my email ... or listen to music … until
226 my body gets tired or I get bored and go home ... but ... I use it as a second...
227 option ... since the first one is phone. I use it when I’m alone
228 / if there is something / ... “Give me five minutes” ... or “give me an hour or so ...” “Oh, 
I’m going to check...
229 who has written” ... “I’ll check my mail” ... So I read my email ... and then I go
230 to the news from my country ... then I go to a tarot webpage…
231 any chafardeo [gossiping]... or for killing time ... ... but those are the moments when …
232. /-PAGES OF PERU ... THE TAROT ... …
233. / all ... for instance I enter the site Peru dot com ... which is a page that
234 gives you ... news ... all the things happening in Lima ... everything ... everything on my 
country ... right?
228
235 ... then, from there, when I get bored I visit a women’s site on tarot…
236 it’s a piece of nonsense to waste time ... to have fun ... whatever it comes
237 If I get bored... I visit a music and video clips site ... and if I continue bored,
238 well ... that’s it …
239 NO LONGER THERE …
240 the machine is over ... and I go home ...  
In this extract, we gain an understanding of what velocity means in performance: a 
surf bried enough to stop us from becoming bored when using a technological device. This 
velocity is an emotional performance which allows the individual to keep far away from the 
“deep”, which, at this point, is an unjustified waste of time for him. It is a futile impasse 
(Baricco, 2008, p. 115) which destroys the flow of performance. The “deep” is boredom, and 
the surface is entertainment (Extract 18, lines 236-237).
In order to move quickly on the surface, everything is simplified. It is the rate at which 
experiences occur that allows us to put them in sequence with other things. This is the 
emotional performance of velocity. Everything has to be on the surface, not deep below. 
To facilitate the flow of communication, there must be a common language and a universal 
grammar based on movies or television (Baricco, 2008, p.115).
Velocity performs by looking for gestures so the cyberworld can be entered and exited 
equally easily. It privileges, which creates a movement, a performance, and any space 
generating an acceleration, an emotion. The goal of velocity is movement, performance 
itself. It does not seek experiences, it is an experience. As seen in the last extract, everything 
becomes fast, effective, and turns into an easy system until the individual becomes bored 
(Extract 18, lines 223-226).
Boredom is slowness. It means going back to the queue (Extract 19, line 193), a natural 
component of past time. The past refers to boredom and slowness. It has nothing to do 
with velocity, i.e., a new emotional performance characterized by speed, efficacy, and ease. 
This is why we now try to get rid of boredom and slowness. Baricco explains (2008, p. 
116) that boredom is almost unknown to children today. They are continually doing things. 
They are engaged in various activities at different levels and in different contexts. If a child 
slows down, he falls off his bicycle. The metaphor of the bicycle helps us to understand the 
performance of velocity, the need for fast and constant movement to avoid getting bored; 
for example, surfing the net, and at the superior level: multitasking. Baricco (2008, p. 
116) defines the phenomenon of multi-tasking using the example of a child who can play 
Nintendo, eat a hot-dog, phone his grandmother, watch cartoons on TV, pat the dog with one 
foot and whistle the T-mobile tune. Or a teenager who does his homework while chatting on 
Messenger, using his iPod, sending an sms, searching Google for the address of a pizzeria 
and playing with a rubber ball. Multi-tasking, of course, must be done quickly. Otherwise, it 
would produce negative emotions. Not replying to an email after a reasonable interval of time, 
not being available on Messenger, or not answering our cell phone have bad consequences in 
everyday life. Velocity, therefore, must be a continuous and constant performance. Whether it 
is a matter of genius or idiocy, the brain hungrily seeks more velocity. 
Surfing must always be fast. It is like riding a bicycle. We never stop to see the sea, the 
beach or the boats, because we see them while we are pedaling. And if we stop, it is only for 
a short time. Then we continue.
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Using new technology helps us to get closer to others, and this we do through 
language. Thanks to language we can produce an emotional performance of velocity, in an 
instantaneous and intuitive way. We have come to understand ICT as an extension of our 
own body, as in Haraway’s cyborg model. A comprehensive symbiosis as the mutant concept 
that Baricco developed Thus, we no longer see new technologies as cold and impersonal 
machines. Instead, we see them, emotionally speaking, as part of us. Before going to bed or 
when we wake up in the morning, often one of the first things we do is to check our inbox for 
new emails, and this kind of act is already part of our everyday life.
In this sense, velocity is a basic emotional performance which should be considered a pri-
mary emotion in the study of ICT. If we now go back to the first part of this analysis (Extract 1), 
we can understand velocity more comprehensively as velocity, the use of ICT, progress, the re-
lationship with others, the mastery of time, and finally, the features of speed, efficacy, and ease. 
Have we now understood this transition? Individuals see new technologies as parts of 
themselves, allowing them to interact with others, laugh or cry in front of a flat screen, but 
it is as if we are crying or laughing with the person on the other side of the screen, our son 
or our friends. We do this through language, offering an infinite number of emotions, in 
what we refer to as an emotional performance. Velocity is always present in this relationship. 
Velocity is a constant when we use new technologies. Velocity is what allows us to move 
away from viewing technologies as being cold and unemotional, to seeing them as being 
part of us and producing real emotions. Velocity allows us to understand that machines are 
extensions of our bodies, an integral part of the body, and we no longer believe they are just 
machines. The transition from the model of the cyborg, (body and machine together), to the 
mutant in which there is no longer any distinction between the body and the machine, is part 
of an advanced biology, the natural evolution of human beings.
Discussion 
Emotions have a strong relationship with language. We can express emotions through 
language. To express emotions means establishing that we have something in common with 
others. We can analyse the expression of emotions using Judith Butler’s concept of emotional 
performance. Emotions are not fixed, defined, or static. They are constantly evolving, con-
tinuously implied in an iteration process, and they occur through language, which is natural 
and subjective. This constant iteration makes them appear and disappear from the discursive 
arena. We can see how forgotten emotions are abandoned and new ones are discovered in 
technoscience (Belli, Harré, & Íñiguez, in press). Emotions undergo constant evolution in 
everyday narrative and are expressed mostly in technoscience. In fact, the term emotion can 
be associated with very specific areas of technoscience, thus emotional expressions come 
into play in the discursive arena. The emergence of concepts such as techno-disembodiment, 
or the emotional connection between people and new technologies, namely the concept of 
Nikolas Rose’s machine-affectivity, are examples of the current scope of technoscience. They 
enable us to use the concept of disclosure to think of love in the age of technoscience.
In this article, we have dealt with the concept of emotional performance, which we use 
to argue our thesis that emotions change in narrative. An infinite variety of emotions occur 
in the individual when using new technologies to communicate with others. They can range 
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from boredom to happiness, from anger to love. We do not recognize them independently, 
since only through language, which is irrational and subjective, can we experience them. 
The performance which emerges in the course of the analysis is velocity. Velocity has three 
features: speed, efficacy, and ease. They are still seen as cold and unemotional machines. But 
throughout the analysis we have shown how, due to the performance of velocity, the individual 
becomes a mutant. The technologies are part of our own body and they are no longer cold and 
alien machines, since we have been metabolized into them. Their use has become part of our 
daily practices. This allows us to feel excited, and to express our excitement through language, 
using the emotional performance of velocity to indicate what is happening to us.
People can feel happy or bored using new technology, but the relationship, or conflict, 
between the individual, society, and ICT is always discursive, always constructed as a 
discursive performance, and in this performance, velocity emerges. What is expressed is 
velocity, and not happiness or boredom. We talk to others using this category of velocity, 
which changes continuously. It can never be defined.
The extension of our own body constructed discursively provides the emotional 
performance of velocity. Through this characteristic it is argued that our discursive 
performance is defined. It may be that the interviewee feels happy because she has purchased 
a technology, but that is something we do not know. Feeling happiness on purchasing a new 
blackberry or experiencing boredom as a consequence of having a previous version are 
reasons for wanting to change things.2 
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